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V 


taly's  Contribution   to  the 
Great   Victory 


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An  American  Observer  in  Ji 


"The  writer  of  the  following  pages  was  an  official  in  the 
American  Service  who  was  stationed  in  Italy  for  a  year  and  a 
half  during  1917  and  1918.  His  duties  took  him  to  all  parts  of 
Italy  and  brought  him  in  contact  with  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
men  and  women  of  that  country.  His  opportunities  for  observ- 
ing and  for  gathering  accurate  information  were  unlimited." 


With  a  few  words  of  explanation  by  Herbert  L.  Satterlce, 
formerly  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  U.  S.  Navy. 


immittoe  for 


H«*lpir  Blind 

111    EAST    59TH    STREET 
NEW    YORK    CITY 


PR  I     i         IFTY    ( 


*\\ 


NOTE. 

Please  be  sure  to  read  foreword  on  page  1  and 
afterword  on  page  28. 


*  •  •   •  .   , 

••••  •••••!•■ 

•  •••  "  •   •■••;•    * 

•  •    •  •• :  •..* 

••    •  ••••*«•••••••        •      •      •*• 

"••••«••••••     •   ,,  •  •       •>     ♦•  • 

•     •••    •  •*••.•      ••       ••.•„     • 


Italy's  Contribution  to  the  Great  Victory 


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Copyright  1919, 
by 

HERBERT  L.  SATTERLEE. 


FOREWORD. 

The  writer  of  the  following  pages  was  an  official  in 
the  American  Service,  who  was  stationed  in  Italy  for 
a  year  and  a  half  during  1917  and  1918.  His  duties 
took  him  to  all  parts  of  Italy,  and  brought  him  in  con- 
tact with  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  and  women 
of  that  country.  His  opportunities  for  observing  and 
for  gathering  accurate  information  were  unlimited. 
He  went  to  Italy  a  skeptic  as  to  Italy's  efficient 
assistance  to  the  Allied  Cause.  On  his  return  to 
America  he  was  shocked  to  discover  the  general  ignor- 
ance of  things  Italian  in  his  own  country,  but  was 
gratified  to  find  a  strong  desire  to  hear  the  truth  about 
them.  Whenever  he  talked  of  Italy,  he  found  inter- 
ested and  sympathetic  listeners,  who  were  amazed  to 
learn  what  he  had  to  disclose.  As  a  result,  he  was 
asked  to  jot  down  the  gist  of  these  conversations,  which 
he  has  been  most  willing  to  do  in  the  hope  that  thereby 
he  will  reach  a  larger  audience. 

As  will  be  evident,  no  attempt  at  literary  composi- 
tion, or  an  historic  essay  on  Italy's  contribution  to  the 
war,  has  been  attempted.  It  is  more  a  connected  re- 
cital of  random  conversations,  relying  upon  the  vivid 
impressions  burned  into  his  memory  by  the  events  nar- 
rated, and  supplemented  by  reference  to  personal  letters 
written  at  the  time  to  his  friends.  While  frankly  and 
purposely  pro-Italian,  the  writer  has  sternly  resisted  any 
temptation  to  exaggerate  the  truth  as  to  facts  and  con- 
ditions, and  hopes  and  believes  that  he  has  recorded  a 
just  and  moderate  estimate  of  Italy's  attitude  and  ac- 
complishments during  the  Great   War. 


Italy's  Contribution  to  the  Great  Victory 

For  one  reason  or  another,  it  makes  no  difference 
what,  Italy's  contribution  to  the  Great  Victory  and  her 
enormous  sacrifices  and  efforts  have  been  very  little 
appreciated,  at  least  outside  of  Italy.  The  Italian  is 
naturally  extremely  modest  and  I  found  him  continually 
minimizing  his  country's  achievements  and  lauding, 
even  extravagantly,  the  efforts  and  achievements  of  his 
friends.  It  was  my  duty  and  great  privilege  to  be 
closely  associated  with  the  Italians  in  Italy  for  a  year 
and  a  half  during  1917  and  1918.  I  record  some  of  my 
impressions,  gained  at  first  hand,  in  the  hope  that  they 
will  enable  others  to  know,  appreciate  and  love  Italy  as 
I  learned  to  do  during  her  hour  of  greatest  trial  and 
during  the  moment  of  her  greatest  triumph. 

I  do  not  want  to  be  understood  as  saying  "Italy  won 
the  war,"  for  this  is  at  once  correct  and  incorrect.  It 
would  be  absurd  to  make  such  a  statement  without 
qualifications ;  but  it  is  nevertheless  unquestionably  true 
that  the  war  could  not  have  been  won  without  Italy 
anymore  than  it  could  have  been  won  without  England, 
France,  Belgium,  Russia  or  the  United  States.  All  six 
countries  contributed  in  varying  degrees  to  the  victory, 
for  the  failure  of  any  one  would  have  spelled  defeat  for 
the  Allied  cause.  These  countries  were  like  links  of 
various  sizes  and  strength  in  a  chain,  the  parting  of  any 
one  of  which  would  have  meant  the  parting  of  the  chain. 

Italy's  First  Service. 

It  is  a  fact,  known,  but  little  appreciated,  that  Italy 
first  saved  the  war  in  July,  1914.  I  refer  to  the  fact 
that  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  London  informed  Win- 
ston Churchill,  then  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  that 
the  efforts  to  maintain  peace  would  fail  and  that  war 
-  inevitable  and  immediate.  It  was  on  the  strength 
of  this  tip  that  Winston  Churchill  kept  the  British  fleet 
intact  after  the  great  naval  review  at  Portsmouth  the 
end  of  July,  1914.  Had  the  fleet  been  disperse.  1.  as  was 
planned,  and  as  the  Germans  counted  on,  the  German 
fleet  would  have  made  an  attack  in  force  with  a  fair 
chance  in  their  favor  of  destroying  the  British  fleet  in 
detail. 


Italy's  Second  Service. 

The  second  time  that  Italy  saved  the  war  for  the 
Allies  was  in  September,  1914,  when  Baron  Sonnino, 
the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  assured  the 
French  Government  that  under  no  circumstances  would 
Italy  join  the  Central  Powers,  and  that  France  need 
fear  no  attack  by  Italy  on  her  southern  frontier.  This 
information  released  300,000  French  troops  who  had 
been  guarding  the  Italian  frontier,  and  formed  the  army 
of  maneouvre  which  won  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne, 
and  saved  the  war.  Both  these  assurances  of  Italy's 
friendship  for  the  Entente  were  given  freely  and  vol- 
untarily and  with  no  expectation  of  reward.  The  latter 
assurance  was  given  at  a  time  when  all  the  world  be- 
lieved that  Germany  was  about  to  win  a  swift  and 
smashing  victory,  and  when  people  less  generous  than 
the  Italian  Government  might  have  been  expected  to 
throw  all  their  weight  with  the  winning  side  in  the  hope 
of  reaping  a  reward.  Our  debt  of  gratitude  for  this 
unselfish  act  of  Italy's  can  never  be  paid. 

Italy's  Third  Service. 

Italy's  third  great  contribution  to  the  Allied  victory 
was  her  declaration  of  war  against  Austria  on  the  24th 
of  May,  1915.  This  was  an  extremely  courageous  move 
on  the  part  of  the  Italians,  for  at  that  time  the  fortunes 
of  the  Central  Empires  were  still  on  the  ascendant  and 
it  looked  as  though  nothing  could  prevent  their  com- 
plete  victory. 

The  Reason  for  Italy's  Delay. 

Unthinking  people  sometimes  criticize  Italy  for  de- 
laying so  long  in  entering  the  war.  These  same  people, 
however,  should  remember  that  the  United  States  de- 
layed two  years  longer.  It  must  also  be  considered  how 
much  more  difficult  Italy's  position  was  than  ours.  In 
the  first  place,  Italy  is  not  by  any  means  a  rich  nation 
and  war  meant  untold  sacrifices  in  treasure  and  in  blood. 
Italy's  territory  adjoined  that  of  Austria  along  the 
frontier  of  some  five  hundred  miles.  All  the  mountain 
passes  along  this  frontier  were  in  Austrian  hands  and 
were  strongly  fortified.  The  Trentino  was  thrust  like 
a  dagger  into  the  very  heart  of  the  industrial  section 
of  Italy.  On  the  Italian  side  of  the  frontier  were  fertile 
plains  on  which  were  located  most  of  Italy's  prosperous 


provinces  and  nearly  all  her  manufactures.  All  this 
was  exposed  to  invasion  by  Italy's  declaration  of  war. 
For  Americans,  with  three  thousand  miles  of  ocean  be- 
tween them  and  Europe,  it  is  difficult  to  realize  what 
this  means.  Italy,  however,  well  knew  what  it  meant, 
as  she  had  experienced  Austrian  invasions  many  times 
before,  and  she  had  had  recent  examples  of  what  Hun 
invasions  could  be.  Poor  Italy !  She  was  soon  to  see 
for  herself  what  Belgium  and  France  and  Servia  had 
felt  and  seen. 

When  Italy's  situation  is  understood  she  should  not 
be  criticized  for  not  having  entered  the  war  immediately. 
In  addition  to  the  physical  risks  of  invasion,  air-raids, 
destruction  of  commerce,  etc.,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  for  nearly  two  generations  Italy  has  been  in  alli- 
ance with  the  Central  Powers.  Almost  the  entire  popu- 
lation of  Italy  has  been  brought  up  with  the  belief  that 
these  powers  were  her  friends  and  that  her  salvation 
lay  with  them.  For  generations  many  of  her  best  fam- 
ilies had  intermarried  with  the  Germans  and  Austrian?. 
The  Central  Powers  had  obtained  an  economic  grip  on 
Italy  which  it  was  believed  nothing  could  break.  They 
had  sold  Italy  goods  at  low  prices  (often  less  than 
cost)  and  on  long  credits;  they  virtually  controlled  the 
banks  and  the  hotels  of  Italy ;  they  had  built  many  of 
the  railways,  street  car  lines,  electric  light  plants,  etc. ; 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  young  Italian  workmen  were 
induced  by  high  wages  to  go  to  Germany,  where  they 
learned  their  trades  and  then  returned  to  their  native 
land  completely  under  the  influence  of  German  propa- 
ganda. During  the  eight  months  previous  to  Italy's 
entrance  into  the  war  the  German  propaganda  in  that 
country  was  almost  unbelievable  in  its  extent  and  per- 
sistency. Their  most  astute  diplomat,  Prince  von  Biilow, 
with  his  charming  and  popular  Italian  wife,  was  sent 
to  Italy  in  the  endeavor  not  to  induce  Italy  to  enter  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers,  but  to  induce  her 
.merely  to  remain  neutral.  Austria  offered  to  cede  to 
Italy  practically  the  whole  of  the  Trentino.  Trieste,  Istria 
and  part  of  Dalmatia,  for  Italy's  mere  neutrality. 

In  addition  to  these  considerations  there  was  another, 
and  a  very  strong  factor  working  for  Italian  neutrality  : 
I  refer  to  the  Italian  Socialists  and  to  the  strong  politi- 
cal leader,  Giolitti.  If  it  is  possible  to  conceive  a  political 
organization  having  a  nation-wide  influence  comparable 
to  the  influence  of  Tammanv   Hall  in   Xew   York,  then 


one  may  imagine  what  the  Giolitti  machine  was  in  Italy. 
It  practically  controlled  the  politician  from  one  end  of 
the  country  to  the  other.  I  have  heard  it  estimated  that 
Giolitti  could  elect  or  defeat  three-quarters  of  the  depu- 
ties in  Parliament.  Giolitti  had  been  Prime  Minister. 
He  firmly  believed  that  the  interests  of  Italy  lay  on  the 
side  of  the  Central  Powers  and  not  on  the  side  of  the 
Entente.  He  threw  the  enormous  weight  of  his  political 
machine  into  the  scales  against  Italy's  entrance  into  the 
war.  He  was  enthusiastically  supported  in  this  by  the 
Socialists,  who  were  particularly  strong  in  the  great 
prosperous  industrial  centers  of  the  north. 

Why  Italy  Entered  the  War. 

Those  who  are  inclined  to  criticise  Italy  for  her  de- 
lay, show  a  pitiable  lack  of  knowledge  of  conditions  in 
Italy,  or  an  unwillingness  to  read  frankly  and  fairly  of 
these  conditions.  The  wonder  is  not  that  Italy  delayed 
eight  months,  but  that  she  entered  at  all.  Why,  then,  did 
Italy  enter  the  war?  No  one  reason  may  be  assigned. 
Italy's  enemies  have  tried  to  make  it  appear  that  she 
simply  sold  herself  to  the  highest  bidder.  This  is  the 
basest  calumny  and  those  who  repeat  it  are  consciously 
or  unconsciously  playing  Germany's  game  by  sowing 
suspicion  towards  a  faithful  ally.  Such  a  belief,  if  hon- 
estly held,  displays  an  amazing  ignorance  of  the  facts, 
or  a  refusal  or  inability  to  draw  the  clear  and  logical 
conclusion  from  them.  In  the  first  place,  Italy  does  not 
raise  sufficient  foodstuffs  to  feed  her  population.  She 
has  practically  no  iron,  copper,  lead,  zinc,  etc.,  and  no 
coal  or  oil.  She  must  import  these  articles  in  large 
quantities  or  else  starve  and  see  her  industries  absolutely 
destroyed,  her  prosperity  ruined  and  her  industrial  popu- 
lation thrown  completely  out  of  employment.  It  is  self- 
evident  that  Italy  must  have  these  articles  for  her  very 
existence.  It  was  not  a  question  of  the  highest  price 
for  her  support — it  was  a  question  of  who  could  and 
would  supply  these  necessities.  Italy  could  not  remain 
neutral,  for  then  neither  of  the  belligerent  groups  would 
have  supplied  her  needs.  The  Central  Powers  certainly 
could  not  supply  Italy's  needs,  whereas  the  Entente 
could,  and  would,  in  return  for  Italy's  support. 

But  this  motive,  compelling  as  it  is,  does  not  account 
for  the  courage  and  enthusiasm  with  which  Italy  poured 
her  whole  soul  into  the  war.  Above  and  beyond  all  of  the 


Giolittian  arguments  of  self-interest,  of  the  ancient  feud 
of  Church  and  Stale,  and  of  the  traditions  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  there  burned  brightly  in  the  Italian  heart  and 
mind  the  memory  of  the  wrongs  suffered  for  centuries 
at  the  hands  of  Austria,  of  the  millions  of  Italian  souls 
unwillingly  held  under  the  Austrian  yoke,  and  of  the 
teachings  of  Mazzini  and  the  other  Italian  patriots  who 
preached  and  suffered  and  died  for  Italian  unity.  In  a 
word,  it  was  "Italia  Irredenta"  which  carried  the  day, 
brought  Italy  into  the  war,  and  sustained  her  through 
her  darkest  hours.  No  student  of  Italian  affairs  with 
whom  I  have  talked,  whatever  his  nationality  or  political 
creed,  denies  this. 

Effect  of  America  s  Entry  into  the  War. 

I  cannot  leave  this  point  without  mentioning  the  tre- 
mendous effect  on  Italian  morale  caused  by  America's 
entrance  into  the  war.  Practically  every  Italian  family 
has  one  or  more  relatives  in  the  United  States.  The 
letters  from  these  relatives,  and  they  themselves  on  their 
return  to  Italy,  have  built  up  around  the  name,  "America," 
a  tradition  such  as  surrounds  no  other  name  they  know. 
America  is  invariably  painted  as  a  country  of  infinite 
opportunity,  infinite  wealth  and  infinite  justice.  In  the 
minds  of  some  Italians  there  may  have  been  lingering 
doubts  as  to  whether  or  not  Giolitti  and  his  adherents 
were  right,  and  as  to  the  wisdom  of  Italy's  entrance  into 
the  war,  but  all  these  doubts  vanished  when  America 
came  in.  Here  was  America  dispassionately  viewing 
Europe's  struggle  from  a  distance,  with  no  axe  to  grind, 
with  no  age-long  ambitions  to  fulfill,  and  with  the  vision 
of  three  years  of   frightful  warfare  clearly  before  her 

eyes with  all  this,  America  voluntarily  chose  to  enter 

the  war  and  to  enter  it  on  Italy's  side.  There  could  no 
longer  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  justice  of  Italy's  cause  be- 
cause America  had  voluntarily  espoused  that  cause.  Xor 
could  there  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  final  outcome.  This 
absolute  trust  in  America  was  one  of  the  strongest  evi- 
dences of  the  genuine  admiration  with  which  our  country 
was  regarded  in  Italy.  When  the  American  troops  at 
Chateau  Thierry  in  June,  1918,  stopped  the  fourth  Ger- 
man drive,  and" when  they  gave  such  a  splendid  account 
of  themselves  in  the  Allied  offensive  which  started  the 
following  month,  we  Americans  in  Italy  naturally  felt 
extremeiy  elated,  and,   I   daresay,  showed  it.     It  was  a 


8 

wonderful  satisfaction  to  us,  not  to  say  relief,  to  find 
that  our  hastily  raised  armies  could  meet  the  German  vet- 
erans on  more  than  terms  of  equality.  Much  to  my  sur- 
prise, I  found  little  sign  of  this  enthusiasm  reflected  on 
the  part  of  the  Italians.  At  first  I  was  unable  to  account 
for  this,  until  the  reason  was  gradually,  but  unmistakably, 
borne  home  to  me.  When  the  American  troops  at  last 
were  face  to  face  with  the  Germans  in  battle,  the  Italian 
was  never  for  a  moment  in  doubt  as  to  what  the  result 
would  be.  He  received  our  successes  as  naturally  to  be 
expected  and,  therefore,  with  apparent  unconcern,  much 
in  the  same  way  as  he  regarded  the  rising  and  the  set- 
ting of  the  sun ;  both  were  perfectly  natural  phenomena. 

Italy  Entered  the  War  W  hole-He  arte  dly. 

Italy,  having  entered  the  war,  entered  it  with  might 
and  main.  Within  a  month  she  had  mobilized  under 
arms  an  army  of  4,500,000  men,  which  is  more  than  the 
United  States,  with  three  and  one-half  times  the  popula- 
tion of  Italy,  raised  in  a  year  and  a  half.  Ninety  per 
cent,  of  the  living  male  population  born  between  the 
years  1872  and  1900  were  called  to  the  colors  at  one 
time  or  another,  the  remaining  ten  per  cent,  being  people 
in  the  civilian  employ  of  the  Government,  in  essential 
industry  or  physically  incapacitated.  Italy's  losses 
amounted  to  1,600,000,  of  whom  480,000  were  killed  or 
died  of  wounds  and  disease.  This  death  list  is  approxi- 
mately eight  times  as  large  as  the  death  list  in  the  Amer- 
ican army,  so  that,  considering  the  relative  population  of 
Italy  and  the  United  States,  Italian  losses  in  killed  were 
proportionately  twenty-five  times  as  great  as  those  of 
the  United  States.  There  is  not  one  of  us  who  has  not 
lost  relatives  or  dear  friends.  If  it  were  possible  for 
us  in  our  minds  to  magnify  this  number  by  twenty-five, 
we  would  have  some  idea  of  the  losses  Italy  bore.  I  say 
''seme  idea,"  for  the  figures  alone  do  not  actually  rep- 
resent the  loss.  Italy,  being  a  poor  country,  was  unable 
to  extend  adequate  help  to  the  families  and  dependents 
of  those  who  had  made  the  supreme  sacrifice,  nor 
should  we  overlook  the  fact  that  the  average  Italian 
family  has  very  little  invested  capital  and  lives  largely 
on  the  current  earnings  of  its  men. 


Caporetto. 

When  speaking  of  Italy's  contributions  and  efforts  in 
the  war  only  too  often  I  am  met  with  inquiries  about 
Italy's  one  great  defeat.  It  would  seem  that  the  only 
feature  of  the  Italian  war  that  has  been  heard  of  outside 
of  Italy  is  "Caporetto."  Why  should  we  forget  the 
three  splendid  campaigns  in  which  the  Italian  army 
faced  a  numerically  superior  force  which  held  all  the 
strategic  positions,  and  yet  drove  this  force  steadily  back 
into  the  mountain  strongholds,  while  foot  after  foot  of 
"Italia  Irredenta"  was  being  redeemed?  Xo  more  gal- 
lant fighting  against  overwhelming  odds,  or  stronger 
natural  defensive  positions,  was  waged  in  the  whole  war. 
It  is  a  fact,  though  rarely  appreciated,  that  Italians  held 
a  line  as  long  as  the  line  in  France,  with  almost  im- 
penetrable mountains  before  them  and  with  their  own 
open  plains,  supporting  the  industrial  life  of  Italy,  behind 
them.  Advance  for  Italy  was  slowr  and  costly.  But  let 
her  own  line  be  pierced  at  one  point  and,  due  to  the 
unfavorable  geographical  position,  a  large  part  of  her 
line  must  crumble.  This  was  clearly  appreciated  by  the 
Central  Empires,  and  a  stroke  against  Italy  was  care- 
fully prepared  for  the  fall  of  1917. 

The  German  General  von  Berthier  had  developed  a 
totally  new  system  of  attack  against  trenches,  known  as 
the  infiltration  system.  This  had  been  used  with  phe- 
nomenal success  on  the  Russian  front,  particularly  in 
the  capture  of  Riga.  Von  Berthier's  veterans,  flushed 
with  their  victory,  and  confident  of  the  success  of  their 
new  tactics,  were  transferred  to  the  Italian  front.  The 
Russian  army  had  now  completely  collapsed  and  large 
German  reinforcements  of  men  and  materials  were  sent 
to  Austria.  It  was  decided  to  concentrate  the  force  of 
the  attack  on  the  Italian  Second  Army  at  Caporetto. 
Long  and  careful  preparation  for  this  attack  was  made 
behind  the  Italian  lines  as  well  as  in  front  of  them. 
Forged  copies  of  leading  Italian  newspapers  were  print- 
ed, containing  the  most  alarming  accounts  of  German 
victories  and  Allied  defeats.  The  German  army  was 
even  said  to  have  landed  in  Sicily  and  to  be  ravaging 
the  country.  Perfect  forgeries  of  the  London  Daily 
Mail  were  printed  in  Switzerland,  containing  accounts 
of  Irish  rebellions  and  great  general  strikes  throughout 
England,  as  well  as  defeats  of  the  British  fleet.  These 
forged     newspapers     were     widely     circulated     in     the 


10 

trenches,  for,  unfortunately,  the  Italians  did  not  censor 
the  newspapers  going  to  the  front,  believing  that  censor- 
ship at  the  place  of  publication  was  sufficient.  The 
families  of  soldiers  at  the  front  were  induced  to  write 
the  most  alarming  accounts  of  conditions  at  home  and 
to  beg  the  men  to  return  to  them. 

In  August  the  Pope  issued  his  famous  peace  note. 
This  had  a  great  effect  on  the  soldiers.  German  agents 
told  them  that  the  Holy  Father  wanted  peace,  that  only 
the  capitalists  and  ruling  classes  wished  to  continue  the 
war  for  selfish  purposes,  and  that  it  was  their  duty  as 
Christians  to  cease  fighting.  Italian-speaking  troops 
from  the  Trentino,  Trieste,  Istria  and  Fiume  were  placed 
opposite  the  Second  Army.  It  is  probable  that  these 
troops  were  not  in  the  plot,  but  at  any  rate  they  fra- 
ternized with  the  Italian  troops,  arguing,  "It  is  all  wrong 
for  Italians  to  be  fighting  Italians.  We  are  brothers 
and  belong  to  the  same  race,  and  have  no  quarrel  with 
each  other."  The  up-shot  of  it  was  that  each  side  agreed 
that  should  the  other  be  ordered  to  attack  they  would 
not  resist.  The  night  before  the  offensive,  the  Austrians 
removed  their  Italian-speaking  troops  and  filled  their 
places  with  Jugo-Slavs,  who  hated  the  Italians  bitterly. 
The  following  day,  when  the  attack  took  place,  at  first 
the  Italians  did  not  resist,  believing  that  their  Italian 
friends  were  attacking.  It  was  not  until  the  Jugo-Slavs 
were  in  the  Italian  trenches  that  they  discovered  that 
they  had  been  trapped. 

When  the  German  preparations  were  quite  complete, 
the  offensive  was  launched  against  the  Italian  Second 
Army.  The  new  infiltration  tactics  were  used  for  the 
first  time  on  the  western  front.  They  took  the  Italians 
completely  by  surprise,  as  they  did  the  English  Fifth 
Army  the  following  May,  and  the  French  at  Chemin- 
des-Dames  the  following  June.  One  of  the  first  shots 
fired,  by  bad  luck  struck  the  Italian  telephone  central  and 
put  a  large  part  of  the  communications  out  of  commis- 
sion. Simultaneously  with  the  attack,  a  large  number 
of  Italian-speaking  Austrian  subjects,  dressed  in  the 
uniform  of  Italian  officers  and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, swarmed  through  the  Italian  lines  shouting  con- 
fusing and  contradictory  orders,  ordering  a  retreat  and 
generally  spreading  confusion.  When  it  is  remembered 
that  the  Italians  themselves  speak  many  dialects,  it  is 
easy  to  see  how  such  a  ruse  could,  and  did,  succeed. 


11 

Reports  of  wholesale  treason  among  the  Italians  were 
spread  far  and  wide  by  the  Austrian  propagandists.  X<» 
one  was  considered  too  high  or  too  loyal  to  be  be- 
smirched  by   these   reports.      In   addition,    hundreds    of 

false  orders  had  been  prepared  in  advance,  and  were 
transmitted  throughout  the  Italian  lines.  The  result  was 
inconceivable.  Armies  that  had  been  uniformly  and 
gloriously  successful  through  three  campaigns,  suddenly 
heard  news  of  a  tremendous  defeat.  They  could  hardly 
believe  it,  until  the  reports  of  treason  reached  their  ears. 
These  reports  seemed  to  give  the  only  clue  to  this 
strange  and  sudden  collapse.  They  spread  like  wild  fire, 
gathering  momentum  and  color  by  the  way.  When 
strange  and  conflicting  orders  were  received,  the  officer 
receiving  them  had  no  way  of  knowing  whether  or  not 
they  were  genuine  orders  or  forgeries,  and,  if  genuine, 
whether  or  not  the  officer  issuing  the  order  was  loyal. 
For  a  while  everything  was  chaos. 

General  Cadorna,  seeing  the  enemy  pouring  through 
the  gap  in  his  line  caused  by  the  defeat  of  the  Second 
Army,  had  the  choice  of  but  two  moves.  If  he  at- 
tempted to  hold  ground  on  either  flank  he  ran  the  risk 
of  having  his  force  divided  and  his  entire  army  annihil- 
ated. By  dropping  back  the  flanks  he  could  still  close 
the  gap  and  reform  on  a  new  defensive  line.  He  chose 
the  latter  and  safer  course.  Many  of  the  officers  on 
receiving  orders  to  evacuate  the  strong  positions  which 
had  been  torn  from  the  enemy  in  three  campaigns  at  the 
cost  of  so  much  blood,  refused  to  obey  the  order  and 
retained  their  positions  until  surrounded  by  the  enemy. 
They  fought  until  the  last  man  was  killed,  not  one  sur- 
rendering. Leonidas  at  Thermopolae  gave  no  greater 
example  of  personal  courage.  Many  other  officers,  after 
transmitting  the  order  to  retreat,  broke  their  swords  and 
committed  suicide  rather  than  obey  it  themselves. 

Then  followed  the  heart-breaking  retreat  of  the  Italian 
army  across  the  plains  of  the  Friuli  and  the  Ycneto. 
The  very  elements  were  against  them.  On  reaching  the 
Tagliamento,  this  river  was  so  swollen  by  floods  from 
the  mountains  that  the  Italian  bridges  were  swept  away 
and  thousands  were  drowned  in  the  crossing.  An  Eng- 
lish officer  who  was  there  told  me  that  the  crossing  of 
the  pursuing  Austrians  could  be  compared  only  with 
the  historic  crossing  of  the  Red  Sea.  By  the  time  the 
Austrians  arrived  the  flood  had  vanished  as  suddenly  as 


12 

it  came  and  the  Austrian  army  crossed  the  river  bed 
hardly  wetting  their  shoe  tops.  Finally,  the  Italian 
armies  were  rallied  behind  the  Piave  and  on  a  line  from 
Mt.  Grappa  across  the  Asiago  Plateau.  They  were  liter- 
ally fighting  with  their  backs  to  the  precipice,  for  when 
they  finally  stopped  the  Austrian  drive,  they  were  on 
the  last  ridge  of  the  plateau.  Four  thousand  feet  below 
them  lay  the  Venetian  Plain  and  beyond  it  the  most 
populous  and  prosperous  sections  of  Italy,  whose  cap- 
ture meant  Italy's  death  knell,  and  for  the  Allies  the  loss 
of  the  war.  It  was  a  tense  and  dramatic  moment,  and 
one  which  I  shall  never  forget,  as  we  eagerly  watched 
for  every  word  from  the  front.  Alt.  Grappa,  the  key 
to  the  whole  line,  and  often  called  the  Gibraltar  of 
Italy,  was  captured  and  lost  nine  times.  In  the  space  of 
about  three  weeks,  Italians  had  constructed  two  roads 
from  the  plain  up  the  nearly  vertical  face  of  the  hills 
to  the  plateau  above.  These  roads,  marvels  of  engin- 
eering skill  which  I  have  heard  described  by  American 
officers  as  the  eighth  wonder  of  the  world,  were  prac- 
tically the  only  means  of  supply  for  the  armies  on  the 
plateau.  They  were  supplemented  by  steel  suspension 
cables  on  which  little  cars  were  hauled,  carrying  sup- 
plies. 

The  First  Battle  of  the  Piave. 

The  first  battle  of  the  Piave  I  consider  one  of  the 
great  military  marvels  of  the  war.  The  Italian  army, 
utterly  defeated,  with  nearly  all  its  artillery  and  am- 
munition abandoned,  its  transportation  destroyed,  its 
morale  utterly  shaken,  with  stories  of  treachery  being 
spread  broadcast  by  its  enemies,  this  army  almost  liter- 
ally bare-handed  and  sometimes  fighting  knee-deep  in 
snow,  stopped  and  held  the  Austro-German  army,  flushed 
with  its  victory  and  with  all  the  stragetic  positions  in 
its  hands.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  historic  phrase, 
"di  qui  non  si  passa"  was  coined.  "Mt.  Grappa"  is  to 
the  Italian  what  "Verdun"  is  to  the  French — an  eternal 
glory.  Why  is  it  that  we  must  remember  only  the  un- 
fortunate defeat  and  forget  this  splendid  victory?  That 
the  Italians  fought  hard  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  their 
losses  the  first  day  were  29,000  killed  and  wounded, 
while  for  a  month  and  a  half  their  daily  losses  ran  from 
9,000  to  12,000. 

There   seems   to  be   a  general   misunderstanding  that 


13 

the  Austrian  drive  was  checked,  not  by  the  Italians,  but 
by  the  French  and  British  who  were  sent  to  aid  them. 
Without  detracting  one  whit  from  the  latter.  I  wish 
to  say  emphatically  that  the  drive  was  checked  on  the 
line  of  the  Piave,  Mt.  Grappa,  and  the  Asiago,  entirely  by 
the  Italians  before  a  single  French  or  British  soldier 
arrived  in  Italy.  The  100,000  British  and  80,000  French 
who  were  sent  to  Italy's  aid  were  stationed,  on  their 
arrival,  at   Padova,  behind  the  Italian  lines. 

This  was  quite  proper,  as  at  that  time  no  one  knew 
how  far  the  enemy  propaganda  had  succeeded  in  dis- 
organizing the  Italian  armies,  or  if,  and  where,  another 
collapse  would  take  place.  The  French  and  British  were 
held  in  reserve  to  be  thrown  into  the  line  in  case  weak- 
ness developed  at  any  point.  Such  weakness  did  not 
develop,  and  the  battle  was  definitely  over  by  the  middle 
of  December  when  seven  feet  of  snow  in  the  mountains 
made  further  fighting  impossible.  Two  weeks  later,  and 
not  until  then,  the  British  and  French  troops  took  their 
positions  in  the  line  to  relieve  exhausted  Italians. 

Reports  were  widely  circulated  that  a  large  number 
of  Italians,  even  officers  of  high  rank,  were  executed  for 
treason  as  a  result  of  the  defeat.  Whether  this  be  true 
or  not  I  have  never  found  out.  The  fact  is  that  the 
Government  has  always  denied  it,  and  has  in  numerous 
cases  publicly  prosecuted  those  individuals,  including  two 
deputies,  who  spread  the  reports.  In  no  case  was  the 
defendant  able  to  substantiate  the  report,  and,  there- 
fore, we  may  safely  say  there  was  no  truth  in  it.  It  was 
another  one  of  the  damnable  lies  which  the  enemies  of 
Italy  have  been  so  industrious  in  circulating. 

Italian  Hardships. 

Nearly  all  the  food  and  winter  clothing  of  the  Italian 
armies  had  to  be  abandoned  at  Udine.  As  a  result,  the 
food  conditions  throughout  Italy  the  following  winter 
were  frightful.  Stocks  were  reduced  to  the  vanishing 
point  in  order  that  the  army  might  not  starve.  People 
went  from  house  to  house,  begging  one  blanket  off  each 
bed  to  keep  the  soldiers  in  the  mountains  from  freezing 
to  death.  No  coal  was  permitted  for  private  consump- 
tion, heating,  etc.  And  what  little  could  be  obtained  for 
e-sential  industries  cost  $200  per  ton  and  was  of  very 
inferior  quality.  No  gasoline  or  petroleum  could  be 
purchased  at  any  price  and  the  prices  of  food  were  from 


14 

two  to  three  times  as  high  as  in  America.  When  one 
considers  how  cheap  the  living  was  in  Italy  before  the 
war  the  effect  of  this  can  almost  be  imagined.  To  make 
matters  worse  we  had  the  coldest  winter  known  in  a 
generation.  Yet,  through  it  all,  there  was  never  a  mur- 
mur of  complaint,  but  only  a  grim  determination  to  see 
things  through,  cost  what  it  might.  Never  a  word  of 
recrimination  was  heard.  With  no  fuss  or  feathers, 
everyone  seemed  to  get  his  or  her  shoulder  to  the  wheel 
tnd  prepared  for  the  spring  campaign.  As  a  sample  of 
the  energy  and  ability  of  the  people,  I  might  mention 
the  fact  that  the  Ansaldo  Company,  though  frightfully 
handicapped  by  lack  of  coal,  steel  and  labor,  was  able 
to  turn  out  field  artillery  at  a  rate  greater  than  that 
reached  in  the  whole  United  States,  with  all  the  re- 
sources of  our  country  and  our  110,000,000  people. 

As  though  Italy  had  not  already  suffered  enough  at 
the  hands  of  her  enemies,  nature  had  reserved  for  her 
an  even  greater  affliction.  The  Spanish  Influenza  broke 
out  during  the  winter  of  1917-1918  and  raged  through- 
out Italy  with  a  severity  probably  not  equalled  in  any 
other  country.  The  deaths  from  this  scourge  are  esti- 
mated at  over  a  million.  All  public  funerals  were  for- 
bidden and  all  burials  took  place  at  night.  So  horrible 
were  the  conditions  that  at  times  many  bodies  had  to 
be  buried  without  coffins  in  a  common  grave. 

How  Italy  got  through  this  terrible  winter  without 
collapsing  will  always  be  a  mystery  to  me.  Only 
people  with  a  stern  determination  and  inspired  by  an 
ideal  could  have  persevered.  It  would  be  useless  to 
'try  to  depict  the  suffering,  but  I  wish  that  my  pen  had 
power  to  draw  a  picture  of  the  bravery  and  actual  cheer- 
fulness with  which  it  was  endured.  By  spring  the  army 
miraculously  had  been  re-equipped,  thanks  largely  to 
the  foresight  of  the  Perrone  Brothers,  those  geniuses 
who  are  at  the  head  of  the  Ansaldo  Company. 

The  Second  Battle  of  the  Piave. 

With  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign  there  was 
comparative  inactivity  on  the  Italian  front.  The  people 
of  America  will  probably  remember  the  disheartening 
news  which  was  daily  received  from  the  French  front. 
On  the  twenty-first  of  March,  the  first  great  German 
offensive  of  1918  was  launched,  and  for  the  next  three 
months  it  seemed  that  nothing  could  stay  the  onrush  of 


15 

our  enemies.  Wherever  they  struck  the  Allied  line,  it 
seemed  to  crumble  under  their  pressure.  I  can  safely 
say  that  the  darkest  days  of  the  whole  war  were  in 
June.  \l)\S.  One  never  heard  a  laugh  and  rarely  saw  a 
smile.  People  spoke  in  a  subdued  tone,  and  even  those 
who  were  about  the  streets  seemed  to  walk  as  though 
under  a  burden.  We  heard  constant  reports  of  an 
Austro-German  concentration  on  the  Italian  front. 
Daily  we  were  expecting  the  great  drive  and  wondering 
if  the  sad  scenes  being  witnessed  in  France  were  to  be 
re-enacted  in  Italy.  In  the  middle  of  June  the  long 
expected  news  was  flashed  that  the  Austrians.  heavily 
re-enforced  by  Germans,  had  crossed  the  Piave.  It 
seemed  to  us  behind  the  lines  that  the  end  was  in  sight, 
but  General  Diaz  was  not  a  man  to  be  easily  discour- 
aged. Through  the  tedious  winter  he  had  reconstructed 
the  Italian  army  and  it  was  now  to  prove  its  worth.  The 
long  heralded  Austro-German  drive  was  literally  stopped 
in  its  tracks,  and  the  Huns  were  hurled  back  across  the 
Piave  leaving  46,000  prisoners  behind.  Grim  old  Or- 
lando embraced  the  messenger  who  brought  the  news 
and  kissed  him,  and  then  rushed  to  the  Palazzo  Monte- 
citorio,  where  Parliament  was  in  session  and  broke  in 
upon  the  deliberations,  waiving  the  despatch  and  shout- 
ing the  glad  news.  I  do  not  believe  that  anyone  in 
America  can  appreciate  what  this  meant.  This  was  the 
first  Allied  victory  in  1918,  following  a  long  and  dis- 
heartening series  of  defeats.  The  British  division  on 
the  Piave  played  a  splendid  part  in  the  battle,  but  never- 
theless the  forces  were  overwhelmingly  Italian  and  the 
credit  must  be  given  to  Italy.  There  was  no  question 
then  of  fighting  a  demoralized  enemy.  The  Huns  were 
flushed  with  victory,  their  morale  at  the  highest,  their 
preparations  thorough,  their  re-enforcements  of  Ger- 
man troops,  particularly  artillery,  formidable,  and  their 
defeat  was  complete.  What  effect  this  first  defeat  had 
upon  the  enemy  morale,  and  how  great  or  small  a  part 
it  played  in  the  final  defeat  of  that  year,  I  am  unable 
to  say.  Put  this  I  do  know,  had  the  enemy  been  success- 
ful in  putting  Italy  out  of  the  war,  seventy-four  Austrian 
divisions  and  numerous  German  divisions  would  have 
been  released  for  service  on  the  French  front.  With 
the  forces  as  delicately  balanced  as  they  were  until  Au- 
gust, I  fear  the  chances  would  have  been  very  greatly 
in  Germany's  favor.    Certainly  the  end  of  the  war  would 


16 

have  been  indefinitely  postponed.  If  this  second  battle 
of  the  Piave  did  not  save  the  Allied  cause,  it  at  least 
very  materially  shortened  the  war  and  saved  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Allied  soldiers  and  billions  of  dollars. 
It  is  one  more  debt  we  owe  Italy  and  one  not  always 
appreciated,  or  paid. 

The  Summer  of  ipi8. 

Through  the  summer  there  was  comparative  inac- 
tivity along  the  Italian  front.  On  the  eighteenth  of 
July  Marshal  Foch  launched  his  first  offensive,  which 
was  destined  to  be  converted  into  a  triumphal  march, 
ending  only  in  the  complete  defeat  of  the  enemy. 
Critics  of  Italy — many  of  them  genuine  friends  of  Italy 
— wondered  why  there  was  no  Italian  offensive.  One 
heard  the  question  on  all  sides,  sometimes  with  friendly 
concern,  but  often,  unfortunately,  with  a  sneer.  The 
reason  was  perfectly  plain  to  anyone  at  all  conversant 
with  the  facts.  General  Diaz  had  at  his  disposal  fifty- 
one  Italian  divisions,  two  divisions  of  British  and  one 
division  of  French,  to  which  was  finally  added  a  single 
regiment  of  American  infantry  and  some  American 
hospital  units.  Opposed  to  him  were  seventy-four 
Austrian  divisions  with  a  superiority  of  1,250  guns  and 
with  all  the  mountain  passes  and  strategic  points  in  their 
possession.  If  one  will  turn  to  the  map  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  Italian  line  followed  the  line  of  the  Piave  from 
the  sea  to  the  edge  of  the  mountains  at  Mt.  Grappa. 
From  here  it  turned  westward  along  the  southernmost 
edge  of  the  Asiago  Plateau  and  thence  to  Lake  Garda. 
It  is  possible  that  the  Italians  might  have  crossed  the 
Piave  and  even  progressed  a  considerable  distance  into 
the  Venetian  Plain.  Had  they  done  so,  however,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  their  entire  line  of  communica- 
tions was  constantly  threatened  from  the  Asiago  front. 
From  this  plateau,  if  the  enemy  succeeded  in  break- 
ing through  the  Italian  line,  it  would  have  meant 
the  complete  envelopment  and  disaster  of  any  troops 
beyond  the  Piave.  It  would  have  been  military  sui- 
cide to  have  risked  such  a  campaign.  A  drive  into 
the  mountain  regions  to  the  north  would  have  met  with 
certain  defeat  unless  the  Italian  armies  could  have  been 
re-enforced  so  as  to  give  them  a  superiority  of  numbers, 
and  especially  of  artillery.  So  long  as  they  remained 
hopelessly  outclassed  in  numbers  and  supplies  the  offen- 


17 

sivc  was  utterly  out  of  the  question.  The  Italians  re- 
peatedly begged  for  some  of  the  American  re-enforce- 
ments which  were  pouring  into  France  in  enormous 
numbers,  stating  confidently  that  with  300,000  American 
troops  and  a  mobile  reserve,  they  would  go  to  Laibach 
and  thence  to  Vienna,  thus  ending  the  war  by  knocking 
Austria  out  of  the  fight  and  isolating  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey.  I  confidently  believe  they  would  have  done  it. 
The  Supreme  Council  thought  otherwise,  so  the  Italian 
army  was  doomed  to  an  enforced  inactive  defensive 
throughout  the  summer.  I  again  draw  attention  to  the 
fact  that  all  this  time  seventy-four  Austrian  divisions 
were  immobilized  on  the  Italian  front.  Had  Hindenburg 
had  these  Austrian  forces  as  a  reserve,  the  victory  could 
not  have  been  obtained  in  1918. 

The  Victory  of  Vxttorio-Vcncto. 

In  the  fall  came  the  Bulgarian  and  Turkish  collapse. 
Although  still  outnumbered  and  outpositioned,  Diaz  had 
been  enabled  to  supply  many  of  his  deficiencies  in  artil- 
lery  and   equipment,    and    determined    on    an    offensive. 
On   the   twenty-fourth   of   October   this   offensive   com- 
menced by  a  crossing  of  the  upper  Piave  and  a  drive 
up  the  Brenta  Valley.     Once  again  one  of  those  sudden 
floods    from    the    mountains    caused    the    Piave    to    rise 
sweeping    away    the    pontoon    bridges    over    which    the 
Italians  had  crossed.     For  more  than  two  days  they  had 
to  be  supplied  by  means  of  dirigibles  and  aeroplanes,  in 
the  face  of  a  withering  fire  from  the  enemy.     Finally  a 
crossing  was  made  lower  down  the  river,  and  General 
Lord    Cavan,    commanding    the    Tenth    Italian    Army, 
crossed   with   a   force   of   Italians,   British   and   French. 
In  the  meantime  the  Italians  had  carried  out  one  of  the 
most  daring  military  feats  of  the  war.     A  column  had 
forced  its  way  up  the  Brenta  Valley,  hitherto  considered 
an    impossible    feat,    and    had    succeeded    in    capturing 
Belluno,   thus  cutting  the  Austrian   forces  in  two.      A 
general  advance  was  now  made  along  the  whole   Piave 
front  and  the  Austrians,   after   four  days  of   desperate 
fighting,  with  their  line  of  supplies  severed,  fell  back  in 
complete  disorder.     The  Austrian  Fmpire  crumbled  and 
her  armies  in  the  field,  to  the  extent  of  over  a  million 
men,     surrendered     unconditionally     to     the     victorious 
Italians.     On  the  fourth  of  November  the  armistice  was 
signed.     Never  in  history  has  there  been  a  more  com- 


18 

plete  victory  or  one  approaching  it  in  magnitude.  An 
army  approximately  twelve  times  the  size  of  Napoleon's 
at  Waterloo  unconditionally  laid  down  its  arms  on  the 
field  of  its  defeat.  The  news  of  this  defeat  in  Germany 
was  the  last  straw,  and  the  German  armistice  followed 
a  week  later. 

The  Victory  Was  Italian. 

There  has  been  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  not 
conversant  with  the  facts  to  minimize  the  achievement 
of  the  Italian  arms  in  the  battle  of  Vittorio-Veneto.  It 
has  been  said  that  the  Austrian  armies  were  demoralized, 
without  fight,  starved  and  lacking  guns  and  munitions; 
that  they  were  already  dying  and  that  Italy  merely  gave 
the  coup  de  grace.  This  is  untrue.  That  the  Austrians 
had  sufficient  men  we  know  because  we  captured  them; 
that  they  had  sufficient  guns  and  munitions  we  know  for 
the  same  reason ;  that  they  were  well  clothed  and  fed  we 
know  from  the  excellent  condition  of  the  prisoners  and 
from  the  enormous  booty  captured;  and  that  they  still 
could  fight  is  attested  by  the  fact  that  the  Italian  losses 
in  the  first  four  days  of  this  battle  reached  70,000  in 
killed  and  wounded — one-quarter  the  total  American 
losses  in  the  whole  war.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Aus- 
trians at  the  front  were  in  complete  ignorance  of  the 
collapse  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  and  of  the  internal 
conditions  of  their  own  country,  and  at  first  refused 
to  believe  the  facts  when  they  were  informed  of  them 
after  the  surrender. 

That  this  overwhelming  victory  must  in  fairness  be 
credited  to  Italy  is  shown  by  the  figures.  Diaz's  army 
consisted  of  fifty-four  Italian  divisions,  two  British  divi- 
sions, one  French  division  and  one  American  regiment 
of  infantry.  Opposed  to  this  army  were  sixty-three  and 
one-half  Austrian  divisions;  and  while  the  numerical 
strength  of  an  Austrian  division  was  less  than  that  of  an 
Italian  division,  the  enemy  forces  still  outnumbered  the 
Allies.  The  Italians  had  on  their  side  nine  hundred  and 
twelve  thousand  combatants,  while  the  Austrian  divisions 
totalled  one  million  and  seventy  thousand  fighting  men. 
The  severest  fighting  took  place  around  Mt.  Grappa  and 
up  the  Brenta  Valley,  where  none  other  than  Italian 
troops  were  engaged.  As  I  have  mentioned,  Italian 
losses  in  four  days  of  this  battle  reached  70,000.  The 
British  lost  about  12,0(^,  the  French  a  smaller  number, 
while  the  Americans  lost  one  killed  and  seven  wounded. 


19 

In  the  Mt.  Grappa  sector,  the  American  Y.  M.  C.  A.  had 
established  some  fourteen  relief  stations,  and  during 
the  battle  these  stations  attended  to  more  than  8,500 
Italian  wounded.  American  motor  ambulances  evacuated 
from  this  sector  to  the  base  hospitals  on  the  plain  below, 
more  than  2,200  Italian  wounded.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  number  does  not  include  the  slightly 
wounded,  nor  those  too  severely  wounded  to  be  moved, 
nor,  of  course,  does  it  include  the  killed.  Neither  does 
it  include  the  wounded  handled  by  the  Italian  forces,  and 
it  covered  but  one  small  sector  of  the  line.  Allied  ob- 
servers are  of  the  opinion  that  the  Italian  losses  actually 
exceeded  the  70.000  I  have  mentioned. 

The  Italians,  high  and  low,  were  deeply  grieved  by  the 
lack  of  appreciation  outside  of  Italy  for  their  great  vic- 
tory. I  never  once  heard  any  undue  boasting,  or  have  I 
ever  heard  an  Italian  say.  "Italy  won  the  war,''  nor  ex- 
pressions similar  to  those  heard  only  too  frequently  in 
other  Allied  countries.  But  the  Italians  did  say,  and 
from  the  bottom  of  their  hearts,  that  where  there  was 
so  much  glory  it  seemed  there  should  be  enough  to  go 
around,  so  that  each  Ally  might  have  her  just  share. 
No  one  can  deny  the  justice  of  this,  and  no  one  who 
will  examine  the  facts  can  deny  Italy  a  very  large  meed 
of  praise  for  her  part  in  the  general  victory.  Neverthe- 
less, Italy  was  not  allowed  to  satisfy  her  wholly  natural 
pride  by  bringing  the  surrendered  Austrian  fleet  into 
Venice  where  her  people  might  have  an  ocular  demon- 
stration of  the  victory,  although  this  was  expressly  pro- 
vided for  in  the  armistice. 

Reverence  for  President  Wilson. 

The  Italian's  gratitude  to  America  was  cumulative,  it 
increased  from  mouth  to  mouth,  and,  to  them,  all  the 
power  and  attributes  of  the  country  were  personified  in 
President  Wilson.  The  almost  childlike  reverence  with 
which  the  plain  people  in  Italy  regarded  the  American 
president  amounted  in  many  cases  practically  to  wor- 
ship. The  soldiers  had  his  picture  with  them  in  the 
trenches,  and  burned  candles  in  front  of  it.  Hardly  a 
farm  house  or  small  shop  but  had  his  picture  alongside 
an  image  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  and  it  was  no  unusual 
sight  to  see  one  candle  burning  in  front  of  the  Virgin 
and  two  in  front  of  the  President.  He  was  referred  to 
in  all  seriousness  and  with  the  deepest  reverence  as  "The 


20 

American  Saint"  and  "The  Messiah  from  the  West." 
People  everywhere  believed  that  he  was  to  bring  a  new 
order  of  justice  for  all.  On  the  occasion  of  his  visit  to 
Italy,  the  enthusiasm  of  his  reception  amounted  almost 
to  frenzy.  Shopkeepers  who  told  me  they  would  not 
walk  across  the  street  to  see  their  own  King  (who,  by 
the  way,  is  enormously  popular)  stood  on  the  street 
for  hours  and  fought  for  places  where  they  might  have 
a  glimpse  of  "The  Prophet  of  the  Rights  of  Man." 
People  kissed  the  hem  of  his  daughter's  skirt  on  the 
steps  of  St.  Peter's,  and  held  up  their  babies  for  her  to 
bless.  Foreigners  who  had  lived  in  Rome  for  thirty- 
five  years  and  upward  and  had  seen  most  of  the  great 
personages  of  the  world  come  and  go  through  the 
Eternal  City,  all  testified  that  never  had  such  a  genuine, 
spontaneous  outburst  of  enthusiasm  been  displayed  as 
the  triumph  of  America's  President  called  forth. 

Italy's  Naval   Victories. 

On  the  naval  side,  Italy's  achievement  was  truly  re- 
markable. Since  returning  to  America  I  have  been  sur- 
prised on  a  number  of  occasions  to  have  people  ask  me 
why  the  Italian  fleet  remained  inactive  throughout  the 
war.  The  surprise  of  my  questioners  has  been  even 
greater  than  mine  when  I  have  replied  that  the  Italian 
Navy  sank  more  enemy  naval  tonnage  than  all  the  other 
Allied  fleets  combined.  Should  anyone  doubt  this  state- 
ment, its  accuracy  can  easily  be  substantiated  by  refer- 
ence to  the  published  reports.  It  is  true  that  the  Italian 
battle  fleet  remained  inactive  in  its  base  port,  but  so  did 
every  other  Allied  fleet,  with  the  one  exception  of  the 
British  Grand  Fleet.  Even  the  Grand  Fleet  was  com- 
pelled to  spend  many  months  of  watchful  waiting  for 
"The  Day"  when  the  Germans  would  come  out.  The 
fact  remains  that  the  Italian  fleet  accomplished  its 
strategic  mission  to  the  last  degree.  This  mission  was 
to  prevent  Austrian  ships,  military  or  merchant,  from 
taking  to  the  high  seas.  Not  a  single  enemy  surface 
craft  succeeded  in  escaping  from  the  Adriatic.  All  the 
navies  of  the  world  could  not  have  done  more.  The 
Austrian  fleet  refused  to  come  out  and  offer  battle,  and 
it  was  as  hopeless  to  think  of  attacking  this  fleet  in  its 
base  ports  as  it  would  have  been  to  attempt  a  naval 
attack  on  the  German  bases.  It  is  not  to  be  inferred, 
however,   that   the   Italians   allowed  the   Austrian   ships 


21 

to  remain  securely  in  their  harbors.  Attack  after  at- 
tack was  made  in  these  harbors,  giving  the  world  in- 
spiring examples  of  clever,  scientific  ingenuity  coupled 
with  great  personal  initiative  and  daring.  One  officer 
of  my  acquaintance  succeeded  in  entering  the  1  [arbor 
of  Cattaro  (one  of  the  most  strongly  defended  of  the 
Austrian  bases)  on  four  occasions  and  sinking  six  ships 
in  the  harbor.  Italian  motor  boats,  only  sixteen  meters 
long,  constantly  cruised  at  night  among  the  Dalmatian 
Islands  and  off  the  ports  of  Trieste,  Tola,  Cattaro,  etc., 
in  attempts  to  locate  and  destroy  Austrian  vessels  which 
might  venture  to  put  to  sea.  Italian  submarines  con- 
stantly blockaded  these  ports,  while  Italian  destroyers 
and  torpedo  boats  cruised  incessantly  throughout  the 
length  of  the  Adriatic.  An  Allied  mobile  barrage,  con- 
sisting of  trawlers,  destroyers,  drifters,  mine-layers,  sub- 
marine chasers,  etc.,  all  under  the  command  of  Commo- 
dore Kelly,  R.  N.,  patrolled  the  Straits  of  Otranto  day 
and  night  and  in  all  sorts  of  weather.  Although  they 
were  greatly  hampered  by  a  most  serious  lack  of  ma- 
terial, especially  wire  cable,  the  Italians  constructed  and 
succeeded  in  anchoring  in  the  very  deep  waters  of  the 
Straits  of  Otranto  an  explosive  net  to  block  the  passage 
of  the  German  and  Austrian  submarines  which  used  the 
Adriatic  as  a  base. 

Some  of  the  most  brilliant  individual  achievements 
of  the  war,  achievements  worthy  of  being  ranked  with 
the  best  deeds  of  daring  and  cool  judgment  to  be  found 
in  naval  history,  were  performed  by  Italian  naval  offi- 
cers. To  record  all  of  these  would  be  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  writing,  but  a  few  are  so  conspicuous  as  to  be 
worthy  of  special  mention. 

Commander  Rizzo's  Exploits. 

In  December,  1917,  Commander  Rizzo  succeeded  in 
entering  the  closely  guarded  Harbor  of  Trieste  in  a 
small  motor  launch,  and  torpedoed  the  Austrian  battle- 
ship "Wien,"  and  then  made  good  his  escape. 

The  following  June,  the  submerged  obstructions  and  the 
mobile  barrage  (to  which  had  just  been  added  two  squad- 
rons of  American  110-ft.  submarine  chasers)  had  become 
so  effective  that  the  Austrians  determined  on  a  raid  in 
force  to  clear  the  Straits.  Two  Austrian  superdread- 
naughts  left  Pola  on  the  night  of  the  15th- 16th  of  June 
with    the    intention    of    making   a    rendezvous    with    the 


22 

Austrian  fleet  off  Cattaro,  whence  the  combined  forces 
would  proceed  with  the  attack.  Commander  Rizzo  in 
a  small  sixteen-meter  motor  boat,  accompanied  by 
Lieutenant-Commander  Aonzo  with  a  similar  motor  boat, 
had  been  reconnoitering  among  the  Dalmatian  Islands. 
Motor  trouble  had  delayed  them,  and  they  found  them- 
selves in  the  middle  of  the  Adriatic  just  before  dawn. 
Two  large  columns  of  smoke  were  observed,  and  Com- 
mander Rizzo  knowing  that  no  large  Italian  vessels 
were  in  those  waters,  accurately  assumed  that  the  smoke 
came  from  major  enemy  units,  and  without  hesitation 
proceeded  to  the  attack.  These  little  Italian  launches 
carried  two  eighteen-inch  torpedos  on  racks  which  could 
be  rigged  outboard.  They  had  a  speed  of  twenty-four 
knots.  On  approaching,  Rizzo  made  out  two  large  battle- 
ships convoyed  by  numerous  destroyers  (subsequently 
known  to  be  ten  in  number).  By  skillful  manceuvering 
and  proceeding  at  low  speed  he  succeeded  in  getting 
through  the  escort  of  destroyers,  and  when  within  two 
hundred  yards  of  the  leading  battleship,  the  St.  Stephen, 
he  launched  both  his  torpedoes,  scoring  two  hits  and 
having  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  target  ship  give  a 
great  lurch  and  start  to  settle  immediately.  She  sank  in 
a  few  minutes.  Rizzo  immediately  turned  and  headed 
away  at  full  speed,  pursued  by  the  destroyers  who  had 
picked  him  up  with  their  searchlights  and  opened  fire. 
Making  a  neat  calculation  of  the  speed  and  distance  of 
the  nearest  pursuer,  Rizzo  set  a  depth  charge  and  dropped 
it  in  the  destroyer's  path.  So  nicely  was  it  timed  that  it 
exploded  directly  under  the  bow  of  the  destroyer,  thus 
ending  the  chase.  It  was  later  reported  that  the  destroy- 
er sank.  Meanwhile,  Lieutenant-Commander  Aonzo,  in 
the  second  launch,  proceeded  to  the  attack  of  the  remain- 
ing battleship.  When  about  two  hundred  yards  from  his 
target  he  fired  both  torpedoes.  Unfortunately  one  stuck 
slightly  in  the  releasing  gear  and  was  deflected,  passing 
just  astern  of  its  target.  The  second  struck  the  battle- 
ship amidships,  penetrating  her,  but  as  luck  would  have 
it,  failed  to  explode.  Both  Aonzo  and  Rizzo  succeeded 
in  making  their  escape  and  returned  to  Ancona. 

The  news  of  this  brilliant  exploit  reached  the  world 
about  the  time  that  the  Americans  at  Chateau  Thierry 
were  writing  a  new  chapter  in  history,  and  the  Italian 
army  was  hurling  back  the  Austrians  on  the  Piave  in 
ignominious    defeat.      Consequently,    I    am    afraid    that 


23 

Rizzo's  achievement  is  not  as  well  known  and  recog- 
nized in  this  country  as  it  deserves  to  be.  Coupled  with 
the  magnificent  victory  of  the  second  battle  of  the  Piave, 
it  served  enormously  to  hearten  the  Italians.  Its  de- 
pressing effect  on  the  Austrians  was  correspondingly 
great.  An  eyewitness  gave  a  graphic  description  of 
the  scene  in  the  Austrian  Admiralty  in  Vienna  when  the 
news  of  the  disaster  was  received.  The  Au-trians  were 
open  and  violent  in  their  denunciations  of  the  Germans, 
for  it  seems  that  the  whole  plan  for  the  attack  on  Otranto 
originated  with  the  Germans,  and  the  Austrians  were 
forced  into  it  against  their  better  judgment.  Admiral 
Horthy,  commanding  the  Austrian  fleet,  was  particularly 
opposed  to  the  attempt,  as  he  knew  that  the  Italian 
scouts  were  so  active  that  secrecy  would  be  impossible, 
and  the  element  of  surprise  was  counted  on  to  carry 
the  effort  through.  Of  course,  with  the  sinking  of  the 
St.  Stephen  and  the  disabling  of  the  other  battleship, 
the  whole  attack  was  called  off.  Thus  Rizzo  by  his 
skill  and  daring  not  only  destroyed  the  newest  and 
strongest  unit  in  the  Austrian  fleet,  but  undoubtedly 
saved  many  Allied  vessels  and  lives  as  well. 

The  Italian  Sea-Tank. 

Meanwhile,  a  new  type  of  vessel,  which  may  be  de- 
scribed as  a  sea-tank,  had  been  invented  and  built  by 
the  Italian  navy.  This  tank  was  of  rectangular  shape, 
much  resembling  an  ordinary  scow  or  sea  sled.  The 
propeller  was  housed  in  a  channel  in  the  stern  of  the 
boat.  On  the  outboard  sides,  fore  and  aft,  ran  two 
continuous  chains,  one  to  starboard  and  one  to  port, 
very  much  resembling  the  caterpillar  treads  of  a  land 
tank.  On  these  endless  chains  strong  claws  were  placed 
a  meter  apart.  Commander  Pellegrini,  in  command  of 
this  tank,  approached  the  Harbor  of  Pola  one  dark  night 
in  July,  1918.  On  getting  within  earshot  of  the  defense, 
the  gasoline  motor  was  stopped  and  the  tank  was  pro- 
pelled at  slow  speed  with  an  electric  motor  running 
silently.  On  reaching  the  formidable  boom  obstructions 
at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  the  motor  was  geared  to 
the  endless  chains  and  the  claws  on  these  chains,  en- 
gaging the  obstruction,  caused  the  tank  to  crawl  out 
of  the  water  and  over  the  obstruction.  In  this  way 
three  lines  of  obstructions  were  crossed  without  attract- 
ing attention.     Once  inside  the  harbor,   Pellegrini   sue- 


24 

ceeded  in  torpedoing  a  superdreadnaught.  Of  course, 
he  could  not  escape  with  his  tank,  so  he  sank  it,  first 
firing  a  red  rocket  as  a  signal  to  his  comrades  watching 
outside  the  harbor  that  he  had  been  successful.  Pelle- 
grini was  captured  but  subsequently  released  and  re- 
turned to  Italy,  where  he  most  modestly  received  his 
well  deserved  honors.  I  might  mention  in  passing  that 
both  Pellegrini  and  Rizzo  have  expressed  privately  and 
publicly  the  highest  admiration  for  the  American  navy. 

A  Feat  of  Ingenuity  and  Pluck. 

The  Italian  navy  had  still  another  surprise  to  spring 
on  the  Austrians.  Major  Pellucci,  an  Italian  naval  en- 
gineer, so  modified  a  specially  constructed  twenty-one 
inch  torpedo  as  to  give  it  a  speed  of  about  a  knot  or 
a  knot  and  one-half,  and  a  range  of  twenty  miles.  Two 
handles  were  attached  to  its  nose.  It  was  also  equipped 
with  an  electro-magnet,  and  a  time  clock  device  for 
exploding  the  charge.  This  strange  apparatus  was 
launched  a  few  miles  orT  Pola  one  night  late  in  October, 
1918.  Pellucci  and  a  naval  doctor,  in  rubber  suits,  swam 
alongside  the  torpedo  grasping  the  handles  at  the  nose 
and  steering  it  through  all  the  obstructions  and  into  the 
Harbor  of  Pola.  Making  out  the  flagship,  a  super- 
dreadnaught, they  succeeded  in  attaching  the  torpedo 
to  her  side  by  means  of  the  electro-magnet,  and  after 
starting  the  clock,  swam  away.  Just  then  a  sentry  on 
the  flagship  detected  them,  and,  taking  them  prisoner, 
brought  them  on  board.  The  Austrian  Admiral  came 
on  deck  and  questioned  the  prisoners,  who  kept  him 
in  conversation  until  the  torpedo  was  about  to  explode. 
Pellucci  then  informed  the  Admiral  of  what  he  had  done 
and  told  him  that  he  had  just  time  to  abandon  ship,  but 
that  he  would  not  be  able  to  find  the  torpedo  before  it 
exploded.  The  Admiral,  at  last  realizing  that  Pellucci  was 
telling  the  truth,  and  the  instinct  of  the  seaman  rising 
above  his  natural  prejudices,  congratulated  the  prison- 
ers on  having  performed  a  very  daring  and  gallant  act 
and  told  them  he  hoped  they  would  be  spared  to  return 
to  their  country  and  receive  the  honors  which  were  due 
them.  All  hands  barely  had  time  to  jump  overboard 
and  swim  away  from  the  flagship  when  the  torpedo  ex- 
ploded, completely  wrecking  her.  The  chivalrous  Ad- 
miral made  no  attempt  to  leave  his  ship  but  perished 
with  her. 


25 

The  complete  collapse  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  a  few- 
days  later,  I  feel  sure  prevented  the  Italian  navy  from 
writing  several  more  glorious  pages  to  this  history.     I 

hope  that  Americans  will  feel  interested  enough  in  the 
work  of  this  faithful  Ally  to  devote  a  little  time  to  the 
study  of  her  naval  achievements  in  the  late  war.  They 
will  find  themselves  amply  repaid. 

Italian  Generosity. 

I  have  mentioned  before,  and  wish  to  repeat,  that 
whatever  Italy's  national  faults  may  be,  bragging  and 
self-advertisement  are  not  among  them.  I  wish  to  add 
most  emphatically  that  cupidity  was  strikingly  conspicu- 
ous by  its  absence.  Of  course,  travellers  will  occasion- 
allv  be  robbed  by  cabmen,  guides,  small  shop  keepers, 
and  sometimes  by  an  unscrupulous  manager  of  a  small 
hotel.  This  happens  to  strangers  in  every  country,  what- 
ever the  country  may  be,  and  America  most  assuredly 
is  not  free  from  this  accusation.  During  a  year  and  a 
half  in  Italy  in  the  midst  of  the  war,  I  was  forcibly 
struck  with  the  absence  of  extortionate  charges  to  for- 
eigners, or,  at  any  rate,  to  Americans.  I  found  that  my 
experience  in  this  regard  was  not  unique,  but  was  shared 
by  many  other  Americans.  Of  course,  prices  were  tre- 
mendously high,  but  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  there 
was  but  one  price  for  native  and  for  foreigner  alike. 
At  least  one  circumstance  made  me  marvel  at  this  ab- 
sence of  extortion.  We  had  a  number  of  American 
living  cadets  at  an  Italian  aviation  school  at  Foggia. 
Officially,  these  cadets  had  but  the  rank  of  an  enlisted 
man.  You  can  imagine  the  surprise  of  the  Italians 
when  they  learned  that  these  private  soldiers  received 
one  hundred  dollars  per  month  pay.  Many  of  these 
young  men  had  private  means  and  received  additional 
money  from  home.  They  always  stopped  at  the  most 
expensive  hotels,  dined  in  the  most  expensive  restaur- 
ants, always  rode  in  cabs  and  were  lavish  with  their  tips. 
Of  course,  many  Italians  thought  that  these  conditions 
were  typical  of  conditions  in  the  American  army,  and  if 
enlisted  men  had  so  much  money  to  throw  away,  the 
officers  must  necessarily  come  from  the  traditional  Amer- 
ican millionaire  class.  One  could  hardly  blame  some 
shop  keepers  whose  trade  had  been  ruined  by  the  ab- 
sence of  tourists,  if  occasionally  one  of  them  over- 
charged, but  I   can  assure  you  that  such  cases  were  of 


26 

very,  very  rare  occurrence,  and  when  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  authorities  were  invariably  severely  dealt 
with. 

The  Italian  Government  was  equally  generous  in  its 
dealings  with  the  Americans,  and  I  wish  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  Italy  is  not  by  any  means  a  wealthy  country. 
In  fact,  her  national  debt  as  a  result  of  her  allying  her- 
self with  our  cause  has  now  reached  the  appalling  figure 
of  more  than  sixty-four  per  cent,  of  her  total  national 
wealth.  Nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  a  long  series  of 
negotiations  I  never  once  so  much  as  heard  of  an  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  the  Italian  Government  to  impose 
any  but  the  most  fair  and  reasonable  terms.  For  in- 
stance, Italy  was  the  only  Allied  nation  where,  so  far 
as  I  am  aware,  free  transportation  on  the  national  rail- 
ways was  given  to  the  American  forces.  They  were 
supplied  with  practically  an  unlimited  number  of  blank 
railroad  warrants  which  could  be  filled  in  and  used 
gratis,   at  discretion. 

For  the  training  of  naval  aviators,  a  naval  aviation 
school  was  constructed  on  one  of  the  beautiful  Italian 
lakes,  where  American  aviators  were  trained  absolutely 
free,  no  charge  being  made  for  housing  them,  for  in- 
struction, for  use  or  replacement  of  planes  or  their 
apparatus,  for  gasoline,  oil  or  anything  else.  The  Amer- 
icans were  simply  required  to  feed,  clothe  and  pay  their 
own  forces.  At  the  naval  aviation  stations  in  Italy, 
which  were  taken  over  or  were  to  be  taken  over  by  the 
American  navy,  the  buildings  and  original  equipment, 
including  planes,  fuel  and  even  motor  cars,  were  sup- 
plied free  by  the  Italians.  Again  the  Americans  were 
merely  required  to  feed,  pay  and  clothe  their  own  forces, 
with  the  further  request  that,  owing  to  the  great  shortage 
of  aviation  material  in  Italy,  it  was  hoped  that  we  would 
replace  the  Italian  machines  if  and  when  the  American 
machines  arrived  in  sufficient  quantities.  But  even  this 
was  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  and  fairness  of  the 
Americans.  Visiting  American  missions  (and  their  num- 
ber was  legion)  were  invariably  the  guests  of  the  Italian 
Government  who  paid  all  their  expenses.  American 
tugs  operating  along  the  Italian  coasts  were  furnished 
with  what  supplies  they  needed  at  cost — frequently 
free — and  they  were  overhauled  and  extensively  repaired 
at  the  Italian  navy  yards  absolutely  without  charge. 
When  the  influenza  epidemic  was  at  its  height  and  the 


27 

sick  at  the  newly  established  American  base  at  Corfu 
had  no  better  shelter  than  tents,  the  Italian  Government 
generously  turned  over  to  us  at  cost,  portable  houses 
which  had  just  been  completed  for  housing  their  own 
sick,  who  in  turn  had  to  shift  as  best  they  could.  Such 
examples  of  generosity  could  be  repeated,  enough  to 
cover  many  pages.  I  have  merely  selected  a  few  that 
occur  to  me  at  random  as  typical  of  the  unfailing  atti- 
tude of  the  Italians  towards  us. 

Italian  Courtesy. 

This  feeling  towards  Americans  was  not  merely  a 
formal,  official  one  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  but 
was  shared  in  every  walk  of  society.  If  anything,  the 
reverence  with  which  America  and  Americans  were  held 
was  strongest  among  the  simple  country  people.  In 
traveling  about  the  country,  I  have  frequently  been 
given  a  meal  when  I  knew  my  host  had  barely  enough 
in  the  house  to  keep  body  and  soul  together,  but  on 
learning  that  I  was  an  American,  payment  would  be 
refused.  If  an  American  inquired  his  way  in  the  coun- 
try, almost  invariably  the  native  would  not  only  direct 
him,  but  would  accompany  him  to  his  destination  or  well 
on  his  road.  I  have  had  a  carabiniere  (one  of  the  mili- 
tary police)  carry  two  heavy  traveling  bags  belonging 
to  another  official  and  myself  for  nearly  a  mile  up  a  very 
steep  hill,  at  night,  to  the  door  of  our  hotel,  where  he 
saluted  and  indignantly  refused  any  tip.  I  hardly  think 
Italian  officials  traveling  in  our  own  country  have 
often  met  with  such  treatment.  Nor  were  my  experi- 
ences exceptional.  I  found  always  that  the  Americans 
who  know  the  Italians  best,  all  told  the  same  tale. 

I  have  known  many  Americans  in  Italy.  Some  of 
them  have  resided  there  for  nearly  fifty  years  while 
others  have  been  there  but  a  few  months.  They  were 
of  every  walk  of  life — diplomats,  business  men,  small 
tradesmen,  retired  merchants,  wealthy  amateurs,  ladies, 
old  and  young,  officers  of  the  army  and  navy,  etc.  I 
can  state  categorically  that  I  have  never  met  one  of 
these  who  knew  Italy  and  the  Italians  well,  and  who 
had  taken  the  trouble  to  get  their  point  of  view,  who  did 
not  love  them  and  their  country.  I  wish  to  be  included 
in  this  number,  and  hope  that  perhaps  these  words  of 
mine  may  help  to  add  many  more. 

AX  AMERICAN  OBSERVER  IN  ITALY. 


28 

AFTER-WORD. 

You,  who  have  read  the  foregoing  pages  are  perhaps 
surprised  to  find  how  gallant  and  important  a  part  Italy 
played  in  winning  the  great  victory  over  Germany  and 
her  allies.  We  have  heard  little  about  it  in  America. 
I  have  known  the  writer  well  for  many  years  and  know 
him  to  be  a  truthful  and  fair-minded  man  who  has 
travelled  extensively  and  is  a  close  observer.  I  know 
that  he  went  to  Italy  rather  impressed  with  the  fact 
that  she  was  not  doing  her  part  in  the  great  war,  be- 
cause he  was  ignorant  of  the  truth. 

You  are  perhaps  sorry  that  you  did  not  know  of  the 
great  struggle  that  Italy  was  making,  so  as  to  have 
shown  some  expression  of  your  appreciation  of  the 
splendid  valor  of  her  army  and  navy  and  of  the  tre- 
mendous sacrifices  of  her  population ;  but  the  war  ended 
before  these  matters  were  brought  to  your  attention. 
However,  it  is  not  too  late  to  show  such  appreciation. 
Italy  is  having  a  difficult  time  in  her  reconstruction 
period.  You  can  help  her  now.  Her  military  and 
civilian  blind  are  numerous  and  need  assistance.  A 
committee  has  been  organized  in  this  country  to  support 
the  work  of  Miss  Winifred  Holt,  who  is  over  there 
helping  the  blind.  Queen  Elena,  of  Italy,  has  given 
her  patronage  to  Miss  Holt's  work.  The  "American 
Observer  in  Italy"  has  written  the  foregoing  account  as 
his  voluntary  contribution  to  the  cause.  Further  in- 
formation can  be  obtained  from  the  American  Com- 
mittee for  Helping  Italian  Blind. 

You  are  requested  to  send  a  check  for  any  amount  that 
you  can  spare  to  Mr.  Samuel  L.  Fuller,  Treasurer, 

111  East  59th  Street,  New  York  City. 

If  you  are  an  American,  I  am  sure  that  you  will  want 
to  testify  to  your  admiration  for  these  brave  Italian 
Allies  who  have  contributed  so  much  to  the  great  victory. 
If  you  are  an  Italian,  I  know  you  will  be  glad  to  show 
your  patriotism. 

October  1st,  1919. 

HERBERT  L.  SATTERLEE. 


«fc 


PAMPHLET   BINDER 

Syrocuie,  N     Y. 
Stockton,  Colif. 


ii  mil  mil  mil  inn  mil  in 

CDSllEfi3E3 


14  DAY  USE 

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